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Summary
Following the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime in spring 2003, Iraq’s
external debt was estimated to be $125 billion.  Reducing this debt to a sustainable
level has been a priority of the U.S. government.  Since 2003, debt relief negotiations
have taken place in a variety of fora and led to the cancellation of a significant
amount of Iraq’s external debt. 
Iraq’s external debt comprised four components: Paris Club bilateral debt
($37.15 billion), non-Paris Club bilateral debt ($67.4 billion), commercial debt ($20
billion) and multilateral debt ($0.5 billion).  Debt relief negotiations first led to an
80% reduction of the Paris Club debt.  The Paris Club agreement also set the terms
for non-Paris Club and commercial debt cancellation levels.  A provision of the Paris
Club agreement is that Iraq cannot accept a debt cancellation agreement with other
creditors on more favorable terms than those reached with the Paris Club.  Thus, Iraq
is expected to receive no more than an 80% cancellation from all of its creditors.
Negotiations with non-Paris Club creditors are ongoing, and resolution of the
commercial debt is largely complete.   
The negotiations and process of providing debt relief to Iraq may shed some
light on the approaches bilateral and corporate creditors take toward providing
international debt relief to middle-income countries who would not be eligible for the
debt relief already provided to the poorest countries.  In light of Iraq’s experience,
three new precedents appear to have taken shape: (1) a willingness by the
international community to grant a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to
collect unpaid sovereign debt; (2) an increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief
decisions; and (3) an unwillingness by successor regimes to claim that their debt is
odious and repudiate it.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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1 Creditor countries use different interest rates and levy different penalties for Iraq’s
payment arrears.  Hence, the debt owed to each creditor can grow at different rates.  In
addition, Iraq could claim that it should not be expected to pay debt (or interest) accrued
after the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions in 1990 that made it illegal for
financial institutions to process Iraq’s financial transactions.  
2 Iraq’s debts to the World Bank and the IMF were cleared in 2004, largely by contributions
from Paris Club donor countries.
Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential
Implications for International Debt Relief
Iraq’s debt relief is a priority for both the Bush Administration and Congress.
Debt relief is important to U.S. interests for several reasons, including releasing
funds to help support Iraq’s budget, pay for Iraq’s security, and reestablish Iraq’s
financial standing with international creditors and the financial markets.
  
Iraq’s Saddam-era debt is estimated at $125 billion and has been the focus of
numerous negotiations over the past three years among bilateral, multilateral, and
commercial creditors.  These negotiations led to an 80% reduction of Paris Club and
commercial debt.  Negotiations with non-Paris Club bilateral creditors are ongoing.
The United States forgave its Saddam-era debt, worth $4.1 billion, in November
2004. 
This report proceeds in three parts.  The first provides a snapshot of the Iraq
debt situation following the ouster of the Saddam regime.  The second discusses
subsequent debt relief negotiations and their resolution.  The third presents three
possible implications for future debt relief cases that arise from Iraq’s experience.
They are: (1) a willingness by the international community to grant a stay on the
enforcement of creditor rights,  (2) an increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief
decisions, and (3) an unwillingness by successor regimes to claim that their debt is
odious and repudiate it.
Iraq’s External Debt
The precise dimensions of Iraq’s foreign debt obligations are unknown.  This
is due to disagreements on what Iraq actually owes and how interest on this debt
should be calculated (or if it should be counted at all).1   Iraq’s external debt
following the end of the Saddam regime was approximately $125 billion.  This debt
comprised four components: official Paris Club bilateral creditors ($37.15 billion),
official Non-Paris Club bilateral creditors ($67.4 billion), commercial creditors ($20
billion) and multilateral creditors2 ($0.5 billion) (Figure 1).   The first three major
components are discussed below.
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3  The Paris Club includes the United States and 18 other permanent members: Austria,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Other
creditors are allowed to participate in negotiations on an ad-hoc basis.




Paris Club Debt Claims
The Paris Club3 is the forum where major creditor countries negotiate terms for
restructuring or resolving official government-to-government debt.  At the time of
Iraq’s Paris Club debt relief agreement on November 14, 2004, it was determined that
Iraq’s total external debt to Paris Club countries was $37.15 billion, including
interest. 4  On July 10, 2003, the Paris Club issued a country-by-country breakdown
of its  member states’ claims against Iraq.  These figures are reproduced in Table 1.
Iraq’s debt to the United States consisted of loan guarantees issued between
1983 and 1993 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the sale of U.S. agricultural
products to Iraq.  Iraq defaulted on $2.19 billion of these guaranteed loans in 1991,
just prior to the first Gulf War.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture paid off the
creditors and assumed the debt. By the end of the Saddam regime, accumulated
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Source: Paris Club and Iraq’s Ministry of Finance
Figure 1.  Iraq’s Saddam-Era External Debt
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Table 1. Total Iraq Paris Club Debt, 2003
(in U.S. $ millions, excluding interest)





















Source: The Paris Club
Non-Paris Club Debt Claims
The majority of Iraq’s external official debt is owed to non-Paris Club states.
The IMF is the only definitive source for non-Paris Club debt and it has not made a
country-by-country breakdown of this debt available.  In the absence, CRS has
reviewed estimates compiled by Jubilee Iraq, an affiliate of the Jubilee organizations
which campaign for international debt relief.  These estimates are presented in Table
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5  For the full Jubilee Iraq compilation, see [http://www.jubileeiraq.org/debt_today.htm].
6 Meeting with Iraq’s Commercial Claimants, Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office, May 4, 2005.
[http://www.eyidro.com].
2.  These are unofficial figures, representing only Jubilee Iraq’s compilation of
figures reported in the press, think tank reports, or official government remarks.5 
Table 2. Non-Paris Club Debt (Various Estimates)
(In U.S. $ million)



















In 2003, Iraq’s debt to commercial creditors was estimated to be $15 billion.
In 2005, after further evaluation of claims by Iraq’s government, the figure was raised
to $20 billion.  Commercial claims are geographically dispersed (Figure 2) and most
claims are relatively small.6  Of all the claims received by April 15, 2005 (the date
of the most recent public report), 36% of the claims were less than $1 million and
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7 See CRS Report RL31944, Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future, coordinated by
Jonathan Sanford.
37% were between $1 and $10 million.  U.S. dollar-denominated debt accounted for
72% of all claims, with the remainder the remainder denominated primarily in
Japanese Yen (17%) and in Euros (8%). 
The Debt Relief Effort
Following the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the international community began the
process of helping Iraq rebuild its economy.7  An integral component of economic
reconstruction following any  conflict is resolving old debts and regaining access to
the international financial community.  Iraq, however, was a unique case.  Unlike
many of the world’s poorest countries, Iraq is considered a middle-income country
because of its substantial petroleum reserves.  Iraq would likely be able to service its
existing debts once its petroleum industry was functioning.  Many analysts thus
argued that Iraq appeared to be a better candidate for so-called “debt flow” treatment,
involving rescheduling its official debts until it had the capacity to repay instead of
cancelling them completely as is done for the poorest countries lacking any natural
resources that can be used to generate revenue.  Others asserted that if Iraq’s future
oil revenues were used to fund repayment of old debts, not enough would remain to
fund its current and future economic needs.
Granting a stay on the enforcement of any debt claims was one of the first major
decisions following the end of the Saddam regime.   In May 2003, the United Nations
lifted sanctions and sheltered Iraq from a potential rush of debt claims.  U.N. Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483 prohibits any country from initiating debt claims
Western Europe (43%)
Asia (32%)




Source: Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office
Figure 2.  Regional Distribution of Iraq’s
Commercial Claims, 2005
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8 United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 1483, U.N. Doc S/RES/1483, Section
22, May 22, 2003. 
9 The President of the United States, Executive Order 13303 — Protecting the Development
Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest, 68 F.R. 31931, May
28, 2003.
10 The President of the United States, Executive Order 13364 — Modifying the Protection
Granted to the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Property in Which Iraq Has an
Interest and Protecting the Central Bank of Iraq, 69 F.R. 70177, November 29, 2004.
11 Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, September 20, 2003.
against the proceeds of Iraq’s petroleum or gas industries until December 31, 2007.8
Until that time, the United Nations requires any proceeds from these industries be
deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq, held by the Central Bank of Iraq.
Additionally, UNSCR1483 requires countries to transfer any previously frozen Iraqi
assets to the Development Fund for Iraq.  Other Iraqi exports and foreign Iraqi assets
(besides those covered by diplomatic immunity or frozen) were left vulnerable to
attachment because they are not covered by the UNSCR, but their total value appears
to be small compared to the country’s outstanding debts.
On May 28, 2003, President Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13303, directing
U.S. agencies to implement UNSCR 1483 as it relates to Iraq’s debt held by the
United States.9  In contrast to UNSCR 1483, the EO has no sunset date provision.
In an additional order (EO 13364), President Bush exceeded the terms of UNSCR
1483 to shield the assets of Iraq’s central bank from potential claims.10
Discussion of cancelling Iraq’s debt began soon after the stay was granted on
claims of Iraq’s assets.   Led by the Bush Administration, a consensus was reached
that Iraq would receive debt relief on terms that were unique for its economic
resources, but not unprecedented given the political situation.   Debt relief has been
provided for various countries for political and economic reasons.  The United States,
for example, has provided bilateral debt relief to Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Poland.
Paris Club Debt Relief
The Paris Club is an informal arrangement among creditor countries to abide by
a fixed set of rules and principles for debt relief that have been agreed on by its
members.  Paris Club members meet periodically to reschedule, and in some cases
collectively cancel, the debts owed to them by other countries.   The U.S. share of
any Paris Club debt relief must be appropriated by Congress.
Since the Paris Club was the most organized of all of Iraq’s creditors, and
included the major industrialized countries, it was able to start the debt relief
negotiations and establish the precedents that other bilateral and commercial creditors
would need to follow. 
In September 2003, the G7 Finance Ministers called on the Paris Club “to make
its best effort to complete the restructuring of Iraq’s debt before the end of 2004.”11
President Bush appointed James A. Baker III as his personal envoy on the issue of
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12 Many Paris Club policy decisions are decided during periodic finance ministers meetings
of the G7 countries. 
13 More information on Paris Club debt treatment options is available at the Paris Club Web-
site: [http://www.clubdeparis.org/].
14 CRS Report RL33073, Debt Relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries: Issues for
Congress, by Martin A. Weiss.
Iraq’s debt in December 2003.  Secretary Baker traveled to Europe, Asia, and the
Middle East for discussions with foreign government officials where most countries
agreed to provide some debt relief to Iraq.
The Baker appointment, and the ensuing supportive response from other Paris
Club countries, showed that the major countries were interested in cancelling Iraq’s
external debt even though Iraq had the natural resources to eventually service its
debts by itself.  Since Iraq did not fit neatly into any of the existing Paris Club debt
relief terms, the United States and other Paris Club members created a new set of
Paris Club rules, the Evian Approach to facilitate Iraq’s debt relief.  
Prior to the Iraq case, Paris Club debt cancellation (rather than debt
rescheduling) was only available for the poorest countries.  Paris Club members
began offering debt cancellation in addition to debt rescheduling in 1988. At the 1988
Toronto meeting of G7 Finance Ministers, Paris Club members agreed to extend to
poor countries up to one-third forgiveness of their bilateral debts.12  Over the next
decade, the Paris Club gradually increased the amount of debt that it would be willing
to cancel  from 33.33% in 1988 to 90% in 1999.13   Iraq, however, did not qualify for
poor country debt relief due to its substantial petroleum reserves and thus a new
framework would be needed to cancel Iraq’s debts. 
Evian Approach.  Strong Bush Administration support for Iraq debt relief
likely contributed to the Paris Club’s reshaping of its approach to debt relief in the
runup to the 2003 Evian G8 Summit.  The new Evian Approach introduces a new
strategy for determining Paris Club debt relief levels that is more flexible and can
provide debt cancellation to a greater number of countries then was available under
prior Paris Club rules. 
Instead of using economic indicators to determine eligibility for debt relief, as
had previously been done, all potential debt relief cases are now divided into two
groups: the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and non-HIPC countries.14  HIPC
countries will continue to receive assistance under Cologne terms, which sanction up
to 90% debt cancellation.  All other countries will be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.
Under the Evian approach, a country seeking debt relief first undergoes an IMF
debt sustainability analysis.  This analysis determines whether the country suffers
from a liquidity problem, a debt sustainability problem, or both.  If the IMF
determines that the country suffers from a temporary liquidity problem, its debts are
rescheduled until a later date. If the country is also determined to suffer from debt
sustainability problems, where it lacks the current resources to meet its debt
obligations and the amount of the debt adversely affects its future ability to pay, the
CRS-8
15 Manmohan Singh and Jochen Andritzky, “How the Iraq Deal Was Done,” Euromoney,
September 2005.
country would be eligible for debt cancellation.  During the Iraq discussions,  Paris
Club members determined that Iraq possessed an unsustainable amount of external
debt, and began negotiating to cancel Iraq’s debts.
Iraq’s Paris Club Agreement.  On November 21, 2004, the United States
and other Paris Club members agreed on a debt relief program for Iraq providing a
three-phase  debt reduction of 80% of Iraq’s external debts.  Going into the Paris
Club meeting to consider Iraq’s debt, the United States was reportedly pressing for
a 95% reduction of all of Iraq’s debt to Paris Club members, while the Europeans,
led by France and Russia, wanted only a 50% reduction.  According to one press
account,  Germany agreed to support a compromise figure of an 80% reduction, thus
tipping the negotiations toward that agreement.15  According to the official Paris Club
program, the terms of the Iraq deal are: 
First Reduction: cancels 30% of the debt upon signing the bilateral agreements
implementing the Paris Club agreement; 
Second Reduction: cancels an additional 30% after an IMF program is signed; and
Third Reduction: cancels the final 20% of debt on completion of the last IMF Board
review of three years of implementation of the IMF program. 
When fully implemented, the Paris Club’s treatment of Iraq’s debt will reduce
the total debt owed to Paris Club countries from $38.9 billion to $7.8 billion. This
remainder (20% of the original total), will be rescheduled over a period of 23 years
with an initial six-year grace period of repayments. 
U.S. Debt Relief.  On December 17, 2004, the United States forgave $4.1
billion (half principal and half interest) — 100% of the debt Iraq owed to the United
States.   However, since the United States writes of debt in net present value terms,
not face value, the amount required was much less than the $4.1 billion.  The fair
market value of Iraq’s debt was determined to be $360 million by the U.S. Treasury
and was appropriated in a reallocation of financial resources for Iraq approved by
Congress on September 29, 2004. 
Other Paris Club Country Debt Relief.  Unlike the United States, most
Paris Club members waited until Iraq signed an agreement with the IMF in December
2005 to implement their debt relief. Beginning in December 2005,  remaining Paris
Club members formally implemented their  Paris Club debt relief agreement.  This
commenced the first two stages of Paris Club debt relief. In accordance with the Paris
Club agreement under the new Evian Approach, 30% of bilateral debt would be
immediately cancelled following signing the bilateral agreement and 30% would be
cancelled following the signing of the IMF Agreement. 
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16   Iraq Paris Club Comparability of Treatment Provision, November 21, 2004.
[http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/countries/countries.php?CONTINENT_ID=orient_afric_
en&DETAIL_DETTE_PAGE=4&IDENTIFIANT=397&PAY_ISO_ID=IQ]
17 “Baker Secures Promises of Iraq Debt Relief from Gulf Oil States,” Agence France
Presse, January 21, 2004. 
18 “Iraq Optimistic on Gulf Arab Debt,” Reuters, January 23, 2006. 
19 See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam
Governance, by Kenneth Katzman. 
20 Iraq: Request for Stand-By Arrangement - Staff Report, Staff Supplement, The
International Monetary Fund, January 13, 2006. [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2006/cr0615.pdf].
Non-Paris Club Debt Relief
In some country debt relief negotiations, non-Paris club members participate on
an ad-hoc basis.  In the Iraq case, however, approximately two-thirds of Iraq’s debt
is held by non-Paris Club countries.  Including these countries in the Paris Club
negotiations may have been unfeasible and could have made a resolution much more
difficult. 
Arab creditor countries were not included in the Paris Club discussions, yet
Iraq’s Paris Club agreement required Iraq to offer the same terms to all creditors that
it had negotiated with the Paris Club.16 It may prove difficult to seek such a high rate
of debt cancellation from Iraq’s non-Paris Club creditors.  Moreover, since Paris
Club debt relief came with strings attached in the form of IMF conditionality, it may
be likely that non-Paris Club members will seek to attach conditions to any debt
relief themselves, possibly in the form of preferential access to Iraqi oil, or other
business and investment opportunities in Iraq. 
During January 2004 meetings with representatives from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar — four Persian Gulf countries that,
combined, hold  approximately $65 billion of Iraq’s debt — Secretary Baker received
assurances that the Persian Gulf countries would significantly reduce their Iraq debt
holdings once a sovereign government is established.17  Reportedly, several Middle
Eastern countries will start talks with Iraq regarding settlement during the first half
of 2006.18  Many observers suggest that Iraq’s neighbors may want to wait on any
final debt reduction until they see whether the future government in Iraq will be
friendly to them.  Arab creditors might also want more formal political arrangements
to resolve Sunni-Shiite disputes in Iraq on terms Iraq’s Arab neighbors (all Sunni
countries) would find more equitable.19 
Iraq has resolved some of its smaller debts to non-Arab, non-Paris Club
creditors.  According to the IMF, Iraq’s authorities have signed agreements with
Malta and Romania. Discussions with Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, and Slovakia are well advanced.20
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Commercial Debt Relief
The final portion of Iraq’s debt are commercial claims estimated at around $20
billion.  These are outstanding commercial claims against various Iraqi guarantors
that arose prior to the August 6, 1990 U.N. sanctions imposed when Iraq invaded
Kuwait.  The Iraqi government retained two U.S. companies, Ernst and Young and
Citigroup, to adjudicate these debt claims and to help negotiate various settlements
with small and large Iraqi creditors.  The Iraq Debt Reconciliation Office was
established in Amman, Jordan in May 2004.21  On December 9, 2004, Iraq’s Ministry
of Finance posted an official query seeking information about commercial claims,
including claims held by financial institutions, outstanding against the Iraqi
government.
On July 26, 2005, Iraq announced the terms for its commercial debt
renegotiation.  For small creditors (less than $35 million), Iraq would settle claims
through a cash buyback and cancellation. For larger claims, Iraq would seek a debt-
for-debt swap.  For small creditors, the cash purchase price would equal 10.25% of
the outstanding claim up to a maximum of $4.3 million.  Larger creditors would
receive, in line with the 80% debt cancellation requirement established by the
November 2004 Paris Club agreement, new bonds carrying a face value of $200 for
every $1,000 of their old debt.  The new bonds are so-called “Eurobonds,” arranged
in London and trading in British pounds.  The bonds are guaranteed by the Iraqi
government, will pay an annual coupon of 5.8%, are due to mature in 2028, and will
be guaranteed by the Iraqi government. 
The new Eurobonds have been welcomed by investors and the exchange appears
to have been successful.  The bonds, which traded in the grey market prior to
issuance at around 11% yield.  This is also an optimistic sign for the Iraqi economy.
 Several developing countries, such as Argentina and Brazil were forced to pay much
higher yields when they re-entered the bond market following their own recent
economic crises.  Prices of the bonds have continued to rise and were trading at
around 9.25% yield following their launch on January 23, 2006.  
As of April 3, 2006, the Iraq government has settled $18.4 billion of its
commercial claims.22    According to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance, they have concluded
three installments of the cash buyback offer for small debt holders, and one debt-for-
debt exchange for large debt holders.   Some remaining claims are in arbitration
process, and Iraq’s Ministry of Finance intends to an additional installment of the
cash buyback offer by July 2006 to resolve these claims. 
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Potential Policy Precedents for International Debt
Relief 
The negotiations and process of providing debt relief to Iraq may shed some
light on the approaches bilateral and corporate creditors take towards providing debt
relief to middle-income countries who are not eligible for the debt relief already
provided to the poorest countries.  In light of Iraq’s experience, three new precedents
appear to have taken shape: (1) a willingness by the international community to grant
a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to collect unpaid sovereign debt; (2) an
increased flexibility in Paris Club debt relief decisions; and (3) an unwillingness by
successor regimes to claim that their debt is odious and repudiate it. 
Granting a Stay on the Enforcement of Creditor Rights
In the Iraq case, implementing a stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to use
litigation to collect unpaid sovereign debt was a major priority and was implemented
by UNSCR 1483 shortly after the collapse of the Saddam regime.  Implementation
of this stay occurred with very little debate over whether such a comprehensive debt
shield should be used.  
In fact, such a debate did occur between 2001 and 2003, over the introduction
of a debt shield mechanism at the IMF for countries facing economic crisis.   At the
time, there was concern that several South American countries, including Argentina
and Brazil, may default on their international debts.  During this debate, the U.S.
Administration led the opposition to a comprehensive debt shield mechanism and the
proposal was  eventually withdrawn.  It appears that after Iraq, however, such a
mechanism is feasible if it is introduced in a political context such as the United
Nations rather than economic/financial one like the IMF, and that it is an ad-hoc
process, not attached to any formal mechanism for debt resolution.23
Sovereign bonds (government issued debt) are the primary form of developing
country debt.  These bonds are held by many types of investors, both large and small,
and represent a major shift in the types of country debt.  When countries ran into
economic difficulties during the economic crises of the 1980s, their debt consisted
primarily of bank loans, issued by a small number of commercial banks. It was
relatively easy for the banks to work together with delinquent countries and arrange
terms to restructure the debt. There is now a much wider spectrum of investors in
sovereign bonds, creating much costlier and more difficult resolutions. However,
outside of the Paris Club, there is no formal mechanism to coordinate debt
restructuring negotiations between creditors and  the debtor government.
To address these concerns, in 2001, the IMF proposed creating the Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) to help negotiate debt restructurings in
general.   Among other things, the IMF’s proposal would afford rights to defaulting
countries similar to those afforded bankrupt companies in the United States under
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8, 2003.
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Prevention and Resolution in Emerging Markets, April 2002.
Chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy codes. A stand-still on debt payments would go in
effect, while countries renegotiated their debt contracts with their creditors through
a dispute resolution mechanism administered by the IMF.  The debt stand-still was
considered one of the most important components of the proposed SDRM.24  It also
proved to be the one of the most highly contested issues concerning the SDRM
proposal.25
The SDRM proposal was rejected by the Bush Administration, the private
sector, and many Members of Congress.  The Bush Administration advocated a more
decentralized, market-oriented approach that would include clauses in sovereign
bond contracts, known as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) that would  stipulate
how the financial contracts would be resolved pending a financial crisis or default.
A majority of commercial creditors also discouraged the establishment of the
SDRM. For example, the Institute for International Finance (IIF), a global association
of financial institutions, was concerned that an international bankruptcy court could
inhibit investor confidence, delay renewed access of debtor countries to capital
markets that use the SDRM, and possibly lead to contagion of other emerging
markets.26 According to the IIF, the SDRM also might encourage moral hazard by
encouraging other sovereign borrowers not to pay debts in order to receive standstill
protection.
The essential concern with the SDRM was whether the United States and the
international community should condone an official stay on  creditor rights through
a litigation shield such as the SDRM.  After two years of debate, the proposal was
eventually bypassed at the spring 2003 IMF meetings, when the United States
government threw its support behind including CACs in new bond contracts instead
of creating a new IMF function. 
However, only a few months after these meetings, the United Nations Security
Council Iraq resolutions were passed, providing essentially the exact protections to
Iraq that were rejected at the IMF.   Financial analysts note that immunizing Iraq’s
debts from foreign claims through a U.N. Security Council Resolution is a radical
move in the history of sovereign debt negotiations.  In the past, the U.S. government
has taken a rather hands-off stance that let the financial markets resolve debt
disputes.   This approach, known as the “restrictive approach to state immunity,”  and
codified through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-583),
established that foreign states are not immune from jurisdiction regarding, among
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other things, commercial activity including foreign debt.27  Thus, the U.S.
government typically allowed creditors to sue foreign governments regarding debt
claims, but have not intervened on behalf of U.S. creditors or the foreign
government.28
The Iraq case thus illustrates that the United States and the international
community are willing to shield a debtor from its creditors on an ad-hoc basis,
without a formal international bankruptcy regime.  This can be accomplished
multilaterally through U.N. Security Council Resolutions or bilaterally, on a case-by-
case basis, through executive orders.  Since these measures were not taken in other
recent financial crisis-afflicted countries, such as Argentina or Brazil, it appears that
policymakers are only willing to use such measures selectively, and for countries that
exhibit a perceived threat to U.S. and international security.  This understanding is
made more explicit by implementing the stay through the United Nations, a political
institution seen principally as focused on international security, rather than the
International Monetary Fund, which is primarily a financial institution. 
Flexibility of Paris Club Agreements
In addition to providing a precedent for a comprehensive debt shield, the Iraq
case helped institutionalize increasing flexibility in Paris Club debt restructuring
treatments.   Prior to Iraq, Paris Club members adhered to a relatively strict set of
rules to determine which countries would be eligible for debt relief and for  how
much debt relief, based on their economic situation.  However, whenever a new
situation arose where Paris Club members wanted to provide debt relief, but existing
rules would not support it, new rules were created offering deeper and deeper debt
reduction.  Thus the Toronto terms, introduced in 1988 begat Houston Terms in
1990, London Terms in 1991, Naples Terms in 1994, Lyon Terms in 1996, and
finally Cologne Terms in 1999, each offering increased and greater debt relief. 
Cologne terms, part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Program, allow for
up to 100% debt cancellation for a select group of countries that the IMF and World
Bank deem to be the most heavily indebted.  The prevalence of debt reduction in
Paris Club operations has led to what some have called the “slippery slope towards
HIPCization,” as increasing amounts of debt cancellation have been requested for
countries on geo-political rather than economic grounds.29  Pakistan, for example, is
not a HIPC country, yet it is considered to be an integral partner in U.S. anti-terror
efforts.  When debt relief was sought for Pakistan in 2001, the Paris Club negotiated
a special ad-hoc arrangement on-near Cologne terms even though Pakistan did not
economically qualify to receive such treatment.
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Instead of continuing to treat special cases, like Pakistan, under ad-hoc terms,
the Paris Club formalized a new system of more flexible debt relief arrangements
with Iraq and the new Evian Approach.  As discussed earlier in the report,   following
Evian, potential debt-relief cases are divided into two groups, HIPC and non-HIPC.
The 38 poor and indebted countries that are part of the HIPC program will continue
to receive debt relief under the terms  agreed to at Cologne.  All other countries will
be treated on a case-by-case basis with any debt relief determined by IMF debt
sustainability analysis, with the option for three-part phased debt relief such as Iraq
is receiving.   
The introduction of Evian terms was crucial for Iraq’s debt relief plan.
“Without Evian in place,” commented Euromoney, “it’s hard to imagine the Paris
Club members would have signed off on a deal as nakedly political as Iraq’s.”30
Some argue  that the Evian Agreement is unfair, and opens the door even wider to
political debt relief, using resources that could potentially go to increased debt relief
or foreign assistance to poor and developing countries.  For example, Indonesia,
Kenya, and Georgia recently emerged from decades of authoritarian and autocratic
rule, and are saddled with extensive government debt, yet they received nowhere near
the level of international exposure that has been given to the Iraqi situation.31 “It’s an
outrageous double standard,” according to Salih Booker, the head of Africa Action,
a Washington-based lobbying group. 32
It appears that the new flexibility evidenced by the introduction of the Evian
approach is continuing.  Following Evian, Paris Club members introduced an even
greater flexibility in 2005 by allowing countries to buy back their debt, a policy that
had previously not been allowed.  In 2004, Russia, using proceeds generated by
record high petroleum prices, approached the Paris Club and requested to buyback
some of its debt. Germany refused to participate, scuttling a Paris Club deal.   A deal
was eventually agreed on in May 2005 that allowed Russia to repay $15 billion in
debts at par.33 According to this agreement, Russia debts were paid ahead of schedule
without requiring a pre-payment penalty.
Following the Russia agreement, additional buyback deals were reached with
Nigeria and Peru.  In October 2005, a deal was reached where Nigeria was allowed
to buy back some of its debt at a discount, leading to debt relief worth $18 billion and
a total reduction of Nigeria’s Paris Club debt from $36 billion to $6 billion.  The Peru
buyback, like Russia, was at par, and will lead to Peru pre-paying $17 billion of its
Paris Club debt.  
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As some analysts have illustrated, introducing flexibility into Paris Club
arrangements was well underway prior its handling of the Iraq case.34  However, it
appears that the precedent set by Iraq may open the door to increased debt relief for
middle-income countries.  Combined with the new willingness to engage in debt-
buybacks, resolving international debt may be easier in the coming years. 
Implementing an Odious Debt Strategy
Some analysts have argued that Iraq’s debt is odious, and therefore may be
repudiated under international law. There are three generally agreed upon
components of the legal principle of odious debt: (1) the general population does not
consent to the borrowing; (2) the proceeds do not benefit the general population or
the state; (3) and the creditor knows both of these facts at the time of lending.35
However, the concept of odious debt does not appear to be well established in
international law and has never been cited by either a national or international
tribunal as reason to repudiate a debt claim.36  
Repudiating Iraq’s debts under the concept of odious debts was raised by some
Members of Congress in 2003 in H.R. 2482, The Iraq Freedom From Debt Act,
introduced by Representative Carolyn Maloney.   The bill, which was not enacted,
called on the IMF and the World Bank to cancel Iraq’s odious debt and called on
Congress and the President to urge fellow Iraqi creditors to cancel their owed debt
as well. 
Iraqi officials have steadfastly claimed that they would not seek repudiation
under the odious debt concept.  In an interview with Euromoney in September 2004,
Iraq’s Minister of Finance, Adil Abdul Mahdi said: 
Iraq’s need for very substantial debt relief derives from the economic realities
facing a post-conflict country that has endured decades of financial corruption
and mismanagement under the Saddam regime. Principles of public international
law such as the odious debt doctrine, whatever their legal vitality, are not the
reason why Iraq is seeking this relief.37
Iraq preferred to seek a reduction of its debts through normal and official
channels.  The Paris Club’s Iraq agreement, reached three months after the Minister’s
Euromoney interview, provided an 80% total reduction and set the parameters for the
ongoing debt reduction efforts with non-Paris Club and commercial creditors.  This
allowed Iraq to receive its debt relief without the potential destruction of creditor
relationships than can come about with a debt default. 
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In retrospect, it appears that an odious debt approach may have been difficult for
Iraq since many of Iraq’s debts were taken for economic development or commercial
purposes and appear legitimate.38  None of the debt in question was borrowed during
the period when Iraq was under UN sanctions, when large amounts of Iraq’s oil
revenue were diverted for the construction of Saddam Hussein’s palaces and other
indulgences.  It is also not evident that, at least to a degree greater than in other
countries, the proceeds of the development loans were diverted to personal use or to
fund oppression within Iraq.
Iraq’s refusal to use an odious debt approach begs the question: under what
circumstances could the odious debt principle be applied?   In its current form, the
odious debt doctrine, according to one analyst, “offers no meaningful guidance to
shape decisions on lending to emerging markets.”39   One proposal is for the IMF or
some other international body to assess a regime’s legitimacy and make an
odiousness determination, thus allowing any future government to declare any
sovereign debt incurred by the previous “illegitimate” regime odious and repudiate
it.40  Such a sanctions regime may act as an incentive to creditors, both private and
public, to not loan to problem regimes knowing that a successor government can
legitimately repudiate the former regime’s debts.  U.S. foreign assistance to the new
regime could also be made contingent on repudiation of odious debts. 
On the other hand, the United States, or other nations, may not necessarily agree
with the odiousness determination for various political reasons.  It also may be
difficult to make such a determination while a problem regime is in place, especially
if other forms of political and economic statecraft are being employed.  
However, given that odious debt concept appears unusable in its current format,
refashioning the odious debt concept as a sanctions regime represents one innovative
way to reduce the flow of financial resources to undesirable governments.  Such a
system would create additional incentives for creditor governments and the
commercial sector to avoid lending to these regimes by creating the legal precedents
necessary for a successor regime to repudiate the debt. 
